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Form OTN-2
Monthly intel on jurisdictions, structures, and entity strategy for builders in crypto and tech.
This is to certify that the entry
was filed in the Register on 25 August 2022, under the jurisdictions Articles, Product and Otoco.
Standfirst
In this second part, we share OtoCo's current governance setup as the starting point for the road towards full community governance.
Admittedly, OtoCo’s governance still has some way to go towards full decentralization.
Part of it is age: the project is very young (less than 2 years) and its liquid token younger still (less than 6 months). Some tech that will help enable our vision for business building as a massively multiplayer onchain role-playing game (MMPORG), including the equippability of NFTs, is embryonic still.
Another part is design: incremental decentralization is probably preferable over the risk of instant instability.1
Presently, OtoCo still needs Otonomos as its main backer and builder. Otonomos’ developers are building OtoCo under a development grant, and two half-time employees on Otonomos’ payroll are seconded to OtoCo. Otonomos’ CEO spends about half his time on OtoCo too.
In September, one full-time employee is set to join OtoCo’s U.S. development company as Product Lead, its first hire.
Third, the project is not rich: with initial funding of just over 1MM, we cannot afford to throw money at problems until we get it right, and purposefully want to keep a sense of runway that if we do take a wrong turn, the project can fail. We think this is a healthy dynamic that focuses the mind.
As a result, OtoCo is still rather centralized:
As mentioned above, the first step towards gradual decentralization of OtoCo was made in May of this year with the activation of its Cayman Foundation.
According to its current Bylaws, the primary purposes of the OtoCo Foundation are to facilitate, support, promote, operate, represent and advance:
The key to a Foundation generally is its ability to extend grants, which in the case of the OtoCo Foundation can consist of “assets and/or monies and/or paying for accounts, services, programs, events, incentives, researchers, contractors and/or vendors in support of any of the above Purposes [...].”2 Such grants include grants to cover the expenses of OtoCo’s main devco, but could in principle be extended to any organization or individual around the world.
The Foundation is also expected to designate a project-related software repository, which in the case of OtoCo is https://github.com/otoco-io.3
There is a further provision that prohibits the Foundation to “operate, solely control, have or take sole custody of any blockchain network instance, which may be evidenced by a control of a majority of such an instance’s validators, hash-power, or other consensus mechanism.”4
The Foundation is also allowed to earmark a “reasonable budget” for itself, including from the project’s native token.5
Section 5 of Article 1 is fundamental, stipulating that:
Quoted from the entry
“each holder of OTOCO Token(s) which are revocably contributed to or staked in the applicable designated governance contract of the OtoCo DAO is deemed a beneficiary of the Foundation (each, a “beneficiary”) and has the right to submit and vote on binding proposals (each valid proposal which is comprehensible, lawful, in keeping with the Purposes, and subject to the vote of the beneficiaries by way of the OtoCo DAO, and in accordance with and subject to any applicable thresholds, restrictions, guidelines and parameters in the code and pursuant to the governance protocols of the OtoCo DAO, a “Proposal), and each validly passed Proposal in accordance with the governance protocols of the OtoCo DAO, a “DAO Resolution”) and may receive benefits from time to time from the Foundation […].”
— Otonomos, 25 August 2022
More accessibly, the above means that the Foundation makes of each token holder a Beneficiary, which means tokenholders can receive benefits from the Foundation of any nature, including governance participation rights.6
Article 2 of OtoCo’s Bylaws then deal in more detail with what is termed “Proposals” and “DAO Resolutions”.
It is the key enabling clause that gives the Foundation the power to act upon validly passed Resolutions voted on by OTOCO token holders.
Since actions by a Foundation practically have to be performed by its Director(s), OtoCo backed up this enabling clause with a Special Resolution which obliges its Director, OtoCo Labs Limited in the B.V.I., to “use best efforts to implement and execute each DAO Resolution” as part of the Director’s fiduciary duties to the Foundation.
Article 5 of the Bylaws deals with the Director “Board” (even if only one is appointed) in more detail, stating clearly that “all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the Directors collectively […] as directed or permitted by DAO Resolution, and the management and affairs of the Foundation and actions of the Directors pursuant thereto shall be governed by the OtoCo DAO in all respects […].”
In laymen terms, this means the Director can only ever execute DAO Resolutions, with little if no room for discretion.
Section 2 of Article 5 of OtoCo’s current Bylaws introduces further protections for the token holders by obliging the Foundation to appoint no less than three Directors from the date of the second anniversary of the Foundation’s existence, or 27 May 2024 in the case of the OtoCo Foundation.
Further sections of Article 5 then deal with the Board’s quorum and voting:
Quoted from the entry
“50% or more of Directors in office shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. The vote of 50% or more of Directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall constitute the action of the Board of Directors, provided such action is pursuant to a DAO Resolution.”
— Otonomos, 25 August 2022
The above section may be relevant in a more traditional foundation but is largely irrelevant since Directors in a Foundation with tokenholders as beneficiaries have a fiduciary duty to execute all DAO Resolutions.
Director vacancies and removal is also dealt with via DAO Resolution.7
Sections 12 and 13 of Article 5 put financial protections in place, making Treasury actions subject to a DAO Resolution.
Article 6 deals with officers, employees and contractors.
Article 9 allows for the creation of “sub-DAOs”, subject to a DAO Resolution: decentralized autonomous organizations which further any of the Foundation‘s purposes and which may be wholly owned subsidiaries of OtoCo DAO and the Foundation, and to whom specific functions and responsibilities may be delegated.
Article 8 obliges the Director to prepare and submit an annual report to the Board which is to include a balance sheet of the Foundation and a revenue and disbursement statement., which may be in the form of the publicly visible blockchain address (and transactions thereto) of the OtoCo DAO.
In addition to all Directors, Supervisors too have information rights.
After further household clauses, Article 12 deals with “qualified code and governance deference” in case the DAO code would cease to function as expected, listing six Materially Adverse Exception Events (“MAEEs”), including a bug in the DAO code resulting in unauthorized use of accounts or private keys within the DAO, unauthorized use of an admin function or privilege of the DAO, inoperability, the majority concentration of the DAO’s voting power in a single entity, a legal order or “any other reasonably unforeseen event resulting in unauthorized or material unintended alterations to OtoCo DAO’s core functionality.”
Any of the above MAEEs would trigger an exception response involving first adding all Directors and Supervisors of the Foundation as multi-signatures to the DAO’s wallet(s) to secure its funds, and initiating the exception handling process of Art. 12 Section 4.
Finally, the Ouroboros clause: The Foundation can eat its own tail by altering, amending or replacing its Bylaws pursuant to a DAO Resolution.8
From the above, it is clear that the governance protocol of the OtoCo DAO plays a central role (pun intended) in OtoCo’s workings.
As with most Web3 projects that aim for (or claim) a decentralized setup, coin voting rules: liquid token holders sign at the top of the chain of command, with their edicts trickling down on the Foundation and passed on to grant recipients, including OtoCo’s own operational entities.
However, the arguments against the liquid token-holder-centric model are well known by now, going back to some of Vitalik’s early blogs9, and is a topic he (in his own words) has written about ad nauseam.10
In Part I, we proposed a way to enlarge the voting token holder community by creating a second “chamber” populated by non-transferable NFT governance award holders.
In Part III, we schedule for this bicameralism to be put in place no earlier than 4Q2023, for three reasons:
In the meantime, after the forthcoming pledge of OtoCo Labs’ assets to the OtoCo Foundation (September 2022) and an initial liquid token allocation to the core team, the Foundation will be submitting a first series of Proposals, including a grant proposal to OtoCo Inc. to cover its working expenses.
There will also be a proposal asking what portion of OtoCo’s Treasury should be used to create an initial liquidity pool and on what decentralized exchange.
Finally, there will be a proposal regarding further funding options for OtoCo.
Pre-vote discussions will be mainly conducted on Telegram and Discord via polls, with onchain voting initially on otoco.eth’s snapshot.
In Part III, we provide a clear roadmap towards full decentralization and community governance of OtoCo with clear milestones along the way.
Reference
Read Part III — otonomos.substack.com
---
At least for a project of OtoCo’s nature. In light of the recent Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions of the Tornado Cash code and smart contract addresses, any project that conducts with (vs. writes) code that risks being sanctioned should go maximally decentralized from day 1, perhaps at the cost of stability. ↩
Section 1 of the OtoCo Foundation Bylaws. ↩
Section 2. ↩
Section 3. ↩
Section 4. ↩
Section 5. Importantly, in a Cayman Foundation, such designated beneficiaries will not be treated as a beneficiary commonly understood under a legal or common-law trust arrangement. Under the Cayman Foundation Law, a designated beneficiary has no rights or powers against the Foundation, only those expressly stated by the Foundation. Moreover, a Cayman Foundation does not need to maintain a register of its beneficiaries with their legal names. This means that it can designate beneficiaries by class of persons for example as “token holders" or "node operators” and also reward those beneficiaries according to that class. This is especially useful for governance DAOs that intend to undertake distributions, airdrops of tokens, or other grants to the DAO community. ↩
Section 8 and 9 of Article 5 of the OtoCo Foundation Bylaws. ↩
Article 13 Section 1 of the Bylaws. ↩
https://vitalik.ca/general/2018/03/28/plutocracy.html
https://vitalik.ca/general/2019/04/03/collusion.html
https://vitalik.ca/general/2020/09/11/coordination.html
https://vitalik.ca/general/2021/08/16/voting3.html
https://vitalik.ca/general/2021/09/26/limits.html ↩
https://vitalik.ca/general/2022/01/26/soulbound.html ↩
Form OTN-2
Monthly intel on jurisdictions, structures, and entity strategy for builders in crypto and tech.
End of entry OTN-2022-028
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